This paper asks if mounting reliance on women and girls to solve world poverty is an effective means to achieve greater female empowerment and gender equality, or whether, instead, it threatens to lock-down essentialising stereotypes which are unlikely to dismantle gender disparities within and beyond the home. The notion of a 'feminisation of poverty' has been widely popularised over the past twenty years, and has had some benefits in respect of drawing attention to gendered disadvantage. However, whether the kinds of policy initiatives which have emerged to address this are good for women and girls is more contentious. The discussion highlights some key problems and paradoxes in three popular interventions nominally oriented to helping women lift themselves and their households out of poverty: conditional cash transfer programmes, microfinance schemes, and 'investing in girls', as promulgated inter alia by the Nike Foundation's 'Girl Effect'.
INTRODUCTION

'… women not only bear the brunt of poverty, but their
empowerment is key to its reduction' (Khosla, 2009:7) . 'Women's empowerment is heralded in today's development circles as a means that can produce extraordinary ends. Women are vaunted as a "weapon against poverty" '(Cornwall and Edwards, 2010:1) 'If, as feminist scholar Chandra Talpade Mohanty (1991) (Roy, 2010:69) Since the 'feminisation of poverty' came to enjoy the arguably unwarranted status of global orthodoxy at the Fourth Women's World Conference at Beijing in 1995, women and girls have assumed an unprecedented visibility in development discourse, not only as the principal victims of economic privation, but also as frontline actors in poverty reduction. Through a variety of mechanisms, including conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes, microfinance schemes, and 'investing in girls', the quest for women's empowerment and gender equality has become a vital component of contemporary antipoverty initiatives in which great store is set on female agency as a solution to privation in the Global South. As articulated by Rankin (2001:19) :
'… neoliberal orthodoxy has assumed a distinctively feminised character, as development interventions increasingly target women as the desired beneficiaries and agents of progress'.
The inclusion of, and investment in, women and girls as a pathway out of poverty is in many ways well justified, even if the notion of a 'feminisation of poverty' per se has been critiqued on number of grounds. These include the doubtful original (yet surprisingly enduring) metric articulated back in 1995 at Beijing that women were 70 percent of the world's poor 1 (and rising) , that there has been too narrow a concentration on incomes at the expense of other aspects of gendered disadvantage, and because the 'feminisation of poverty' construct has routinely linked mounting poverty among women with the 'feminisation' of household headship (see Chant, 2008) . These caveats aside, there is widespread consensus that being female exacerbates many forms of vulnerability and can undermine women's and girls' fundamental human rights, including to health, asset-ownership, and self-determination (ibid.; see also Agyei-Mensah, Owusu and Wrigley-Asante, 2015) . This is not to deny that men too can be vulnerable, especially in contexts where job losses, wage cuts and other violations of normative masculinity occur (see also below). However, the preponderant if not exclusive priority accorded to women in poverty owes not only to their comparatively greater victimisation, but also rests on repeated observations that income earned by women or under their control is often allocated more fairly within households than by men, and is spent on the kinds of consumption which better assure familial health and well-being (see Brickell and Chant, 2010; Razavi, 1999 ).
Yet whether female-targeted poverty reduction programmes provide the most appropriate route to promoting women's empowerment and/or gender equality is more contentious. This is especially so when many women and girls are already shouldering the bulk of coping with poverty in their households, and often with little male assistance. Indeed, in recent longitudinal fieldwork in Costa Rica, Philippines and The Gambia, with different age groups of low-income women and men, I became aware of a decided 'feminisation' of effort in respect of individual members' contributions to household livelihoods. On the basis of three major tendencies observed at the grassroots, notably a growing unevenness in male and female inputs to household economies (pertaining to time and unpaid labour, as well as financial contributions), an intensified reliance on women and girls which they have limited power to (re)negotiate, and a growing disconnect between gendered investments/inputs and rewards/rights, I settled on the overarching descriptor of a 'feminisation of responsibility and/or obligation' (Chant, 2008 ; see also Noh and Kim, 2015 , and for useful examples from Ghana, Brydon, 2010 and Langevang, Gough, Yankson, Owusu and Osei, 2015) . In the context of this new theoretical framing I have further suggested that the historical preoccupation with income in the 'feminisation of poverty' should give way to a more multidimensional view of privation that embraces the manifold demands and pressures imposed upon women and girls in dealing with daily household hardship (Chant,2008) .
The 'feminisation of responsibility and/or obligation' resonates with Sassen's (2002) notion of a 'feminisation of survival' observed in the context of international migration, in which she points out that communities and states, as well as households, are increasingly reliant on the labour efforts of women, within, as well as across, national borders. Also relevant here is the concept 'feminisation of vulnerability', advanced by Klasen, Lechtenfeld and Povel (2015:38-9) , which highlights that even if female-headed households might not be poor at any given moment, they could potentially be more vulnerable to falling into poverty because their asset bases in respect of land, credit markets, labour markets, insurance schemes and social capital are typically less robust and diverse than in male-headed units.
In a now sustained epoch of neoliberal economic restructuring which has stripped down universalised systems of social protection (as and where these existed in the first place), and directed ever more emphasis towards encouraging people to extricate themselves from poverty, ideally through their deeper incorporation into markets (see Elyacher, 2002; Prügl, 2015) , the new female focus in development policy is perhaps not accidental, and indeed has been gathering steam for some time. For example, an 'efficiency case' to invest in women arguably extends as far back to at least the 1980s as awareness dawned that the mobilisation of female labour, both within and beyond the home, played a crucial role in cushioning poor households against the injurious assault on well-being imposed by structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) (see Moser, 1989 Moser, , 1993 also Benería, 1991; Chant, 1994 Chant, , 2012 Elson, 1989 Elson, , 1991 González de la Rocha, 2001 'Investing in women is critical for poverty reduction. It speeds economic development by raising productivity and promoting the more efficient use of resources; it produces significant social returns, improving child survival and reducing fertility, and it has considerable inter-generational pay-offs' (World Bank, 1995:22) .
The World Bank is clearly not the only organisation on the Gender and Development (GAD) scene, and indeed the formation of a consolidated and ostensibly more powerful entity for women in the UN Family -UN Womenin 2011 gave hope to many that the human rights of women and girls might receive unprecedented attention in international fora. Yet although UN Women has played an important role in advancing this agenda, it has not itself been immune to neoliberal tendencies to engage with business and to emphasise the economic utility of empowering women. This might conceivably be attributed to the fact that the World Bank seems to have sustained its role as the most influential player in shaping policy and practice on gender, both on account of its privileged positioning within the global power hierarchy and the funds at its disposal.
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In 2007, the World Bank's business case for 'investing in women' gathered discernible momentum and visibility with the launch of its three-year Gender Action Plan (GAP), which was sub-titled: 'Gender Equality as Smart Economics'. In light of the prioritisation in this aptly-named document of the efficiency of gender equality for economic growth, an unfortunate consequence was to sideline '…the moral imperative of empowering women to achieve women's human rights and their full and equal rights with men' (Zuckerman, 2007:1 (Chant, 2012:205) . Indeed, given the cumulative legacy of Smart Economics, and its adoption by several other international and national development agencies (including UN Women), and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as a growing number of corporate players in the GAD field, it seems that economic utilitarianism is increasingly the major justification for promoting gender equality and 'women's empowerment'.
In turn, the particular versions of equality and empowerment aspired to are not only arguably narrow, but based on some rather dubious assumptions and essentialisms. These encompass the notion that women and girls are an 'untapped resource' (which is conceivably misplaced given the contributions female populations have long made to household survival and economic development), and the idea that women and girls represent 'value for money', both because they are nominally inherently more altruistic than men and boys, and likelier to be safe-bet, risk-averse entrepreneurs (see Chant, 2015; Cornwall, 2014; Geleta, 2013; Koffman and Gill, 2013; Rankin, 2001; Roberts, 2015; Shain, 2013; Wilson, 2011a) .
A further and related element in this essentialist assemblage is that women are 'better able to incorporate compassion and humanitarianism within business practice' (Elias, 2013:164) , an ingredient conceivably indispensable to devising a 'cure for the risk-taking, testosterone-driven masculinity associated with the excessive speculation leading to the global financial crisis' (Prügl and True, 2014:1142) . It is little surprise, therefore, that one of the overriding concerns raised in feminist circles relates to the instrumentalisation of women to alleviate poverty, despite ostensible gestures towards 'empowering' them in the process (see Brickell and Chant, 2010; Chant and Sweetman, 2012; Mayoux,2006; Molyneux, 2001 Molyneux, , 2006 Pankhurst, 2002; Rankin, 2001; Razavi, 1999) . Such tendencies arguably intensify a longer-observed trend, particularly noted in the immediate post-1980 era of neoliberal restructuring, for the disheartening scenario whereby women end up working for development, rather than development serving primarily to further women's interests (Blumberg,1995; Elson,1989 Elson, ,1991 Kabeer,1994; Moser, 1993) .
While not disputing that economic growth, and more particularly, poverty reduction, might be highly desirable, questions remain as to whether these are necessarily connected and whether we should be relying on women to carry the can for accomplishing such objectives (Chant, 2008; Jackson, 1997) . This is especially so when anti-poverty initiatives may not take us beyond a situation where women are 'only marginally treated as autonomous individuals entitled to rights and benefits related to activities designed to improve their quality of life' (ECLAC, 2004:54) . Moreover, female bias in anti-poverty policies may not only be intrinsically inimical to women, but in marginalising men and gender relations, can also detract from advancing gender transformation more broadly (Chant and Gutmann, 2000; Chant and Sweetman, 2012; Cornwall, 2000; Cornwall and White, 2000; Edström, 2015; UNICEF, 2007) . Women end-up as the duty-bearers for household poverty alleviation, while men's exclusion can effectively excuse and/or alienate them from collaboration in this struggle. On top of the immiseration and emasculation associated with male losses in the labour market and 'breadwinner status', this can also play a role in exacerbating tendencies to stereotypically 'disaffected male behaviour' such as violence in the home and community, or drug or alcohol abuse (Chant and Gutmann, 2000; Khundker, 2004; Molyneux, 2007; Moser and McIlwaine, 2004; Parpart, 2015; UNESCO,1997) . CCTs in Nicaragua (Bradshaw, 2008) , and in Chile and Argentina (Tabbush, 2010) . The requirements of co-responsibility in such programmes do not simply fail to take into account the direct costs for compliance on the part of women, but opportunity costs too (see Feitosa de Britto, 2007:4) . Indeed the stipulations for eligibility as a beneficiary household can thwart women's own initiatives to earn income, especially where they customarily undertake long-distance seasonal labour migration, as in Mixtec communities in rural parts of the southern Mexican state of Oaxaca (Hernández Pérez, 2012) . 'It is significant that loans, usually involving very small sums of money, are given mostly to women and in particular to women's groups, although in many cases it is the husbands or other men in their families who use them' (see also Geleta, 2013; Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Rankin, 2001:24) .
In the southern Indian context, women suffering the pressure of loan redemption are often forced into the prejudicial position of having to work even harder as wage labourers at the expense of building-up successful own-account enterprises (Garikipati, 2010) . Related tendencies, including greater onus upon women to bankroll household expenditure with limited expansion of their autonomy or rights, have also been identified, inter alia, in Cameroon (Mayoux, 2001) , and
Bangladesh (Cons and Paprocki, 2010 ).
Over and above these concerns, the limitations of microfinance in offering a meaningful pathway out of gendered poverty, let alone any assurance of 'female empowerment', are compounded by a lack of specialist guidance in enterprise growth, weak local or wider economies, and grassroots needs to divert loans to solving repeated crises of domestic consumption (Bibars, 2010; Casier, 2010; Federici, 2014; Geleta, 2013; Herselman, 2014; Mohamed, 2010; Sweetman, 2010) . As summarised by Sholkamy (2010: 257) :
'Development initiatives that seek to help women make an income or take a loan have not challenged patriarchy nor changed the norms that support it… Alleviating poverty and enabling women to make some income can better lives, but the enabling environment that confirms the right to work, to property, to safety, to voice, to sexuality, and to freedom is not created by sewing machines or micro-credit alone' (see also Rankin, 2001; Sweetman, 2005) .
Without addressing the constraints on female agency posed by patriarchy and other forms of structural inequality, it is obvious that microfinance is no 'magic bullet' for female empowerment (Kabeer,1999 (Kabeer, ,2005 . Part of the blame for these prejudicial consequences has to be the way in which microfinance schemes trade on gender-stereotyped essentialisms such as women's purportedly greater responsibility for their families, and likelihood of complying with loan repayments, and perhaps more covertly, their susceptibility to intimidation (Federici, 2014: 236; see also Elyacher, 2002; Geleta, 2013; Herselman, 2014; Wilson, 2011b) . Indeed, even where women are not subjected to direct harassment by official personnel, the group structure of many microfinance programmes effects new community-based 'internalised'
forms of 'surveillance' and 'policing' (Federici, 2014:239) , which can intensify 'resentments and hostilities among women themselves' (ibid.:237). This can lead to women who are at risk of default experiencing enormous personal pressure and fear of being shamed, shunned, and socially isolated (ibid.:238; see also Guérin, 2006; Maclean, 2010; Rankin, 2001) .
While acknowledging Kabeer's (2005:4718) argument that some microfinance organisations can be effective in providing financial services to low-income women, it is also advisable to heed her warning that these do not necessarily empower them, and 'cannot substitute for broader policies to promote pro-poor economic growth, equitable social development and democratic participation in collective forums of decision-making' (ibid.). This proviso also resonates with the more recent exhortation on the part of the increasingly polycentric 'development community' (Korzeniewicz and Smith, 2000) characterising our currentlyevolving neoliberal and globalised age, not only to prioritise women, but also to 'invest in girls' (see Gideon and Porter, forthcoming; Prügl, 2015; Prügl and True, 2014; Roberts, 2015; Schwittay, 2011) .
ADDRESSING (GENDERED) POVERTY THROUGH INVESTING IN GIRLS: ENABLING YOUNG WOMEN TO 'STOP POVERTY BEFORE IT STARTS'?
Since the early 21 st century, feminised solutions to world poverty have taken a new turn in the form of extending the remit to girls, not only as a vanguard for 'turning poverty around', but also 'stopping poverty before it starts' (Chant, 2015) . Interest in girls, however, is not entirely new. Indeed, back in 1992, then Vice President of Development Economics and Chief Economist at the World Bank, Lawrence Summers, proclaimed that: 'investment in the education of girls may well be the highest return investment available in the developing world today' (Cobbett, 2014:312) . In 1995, the emphasis on girls as a development constituency was also recognised at Beijing, with acknowledgement that 'the girl child of today is the woman of tomorrow', and the 'girl child' becoming one of the twelve priorities of the Beijing Platform for Action (see Elias, 2013:162; also Cornwall and Edwards, 2015; UN Women, 2015) . In turn, at least three of the MDGs incorporated an explicit focus on girls (education, gender equality and child mortality; see also below). objective in itself, it should also be borne in mind that one of the major justifications for Nike's campaign, aside from the imperative of improving its own image for 'corporate social responsibility' in the aftermath of allegations pertaining to sweatshop labour, is that adolescent girls are the 'world's greatest untapped solution' to eradicate poverty (Calkin, 2015:655) . As articulated by the Nike The 'positive change' envisioned is one in which, again in line with 'Smart Economics' orthodoxy, 'empowered girls' will not simply glean rewards themselves, but also benefit their families, communities and countries, not to mention the world as a whole. This multi-pronged objective also characterises other initiatives for young women such as 'Girl Up', launched by the UN Foundation in 2010 (see Koffman and Gill, 2013) , perhaps making it no surprise that the tenor of current girlfocused ventures has sounded alarm-bells in some feminist circles.
One of the main concerns relates to the rather essentialist suppositions about young women in developing countries as innately altruistic. A second pertains to the instrumental reliance upon 'feminine values' to maximise the economic and societal returns from girls at the arguable expense of promoting their individual (and collective) rights as a politically and morally intrinsic good and goal (Chant, 2015; Grosser and Van Der Gaag, 2013) . Similar processes in respect of women and girls can be observed in the context of gender-environment linkages dating from the 1990s when actors such as the World Bank suggested a 'win-win' approach to mobilising women for environmental protection and disaster mitigation (see Jackson, 1998) , and in which women have been constructed as 'chief victims and caretakers' (Resurreccion, 2011) . Stereotypical essentialising gendered tropes continue to abound in contemporary discourse on climate change and/or disasters, with women portrayed as simultaneously 'virtuous' and 'vulnerable' (Arora-Jonsson, 2011) , and girls in particular as 'virtuous victims' (Bradshaw, 2015a; Bradshaw and Linneker, 2014:21) . The latter construction owes partly to young women's purportedly moral purity, lack of sexual activity, dearth of agency, yet an assumed capacity to mobilise for the family good in times of crisis, and in efforts to prepare for untoward events (Bradshaw, 2015a) . Such tropes are unlikely to disappear from the frame in the post-2015 agenda, reinforcing the point that '…women's inclusion in policy can be as problematic as their exclusion' (Bradshaw and Linneker, 2014: 23; see also below).
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Pursuant to these observations, the case for prioritising girls by Girl Hub (the Nike Foundation partnership with UK's DfID) is not only billed under the general heading of 'stopping poverty before it starts', but among its four main headlining rationales there is merely one which makes specific reference to girls' human rights (see Box 1).
Interestingly this displays distinct similarities with the UN's Global Strategy for
Women's and Children's Health, 2010, discussed by Gideon (2014:13) Leading on from this, Koffman and Gill (2013:88) highlight the almost
BOX 1: WHY GIRLS? THE VIEW FROM GIRL HUB THE CASE FOR PRIORITISING GIRLS: STOP POVERTY BEFORE IT STARTS IT'S A MATTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS
'Putting girls at the centre of the next generation of global development goals provides a framework for ensuring that girls' rights are respected, protected and fulfilled'.
ADOLESCENT GIRLS HAVE THE POWER TO END INTER-GENERATIONAL POVERTY
'Investing in adolescent girls is not only the right moral decision -it's a smart economic decision… When girls grow up healthy, educated, safe and empowered, they emerge as adults better able to ensure their own success and well-being, and that of others'.
THE RETURN ON INVESTING IN ADOLESCENT GIRLS IS HIGH, SO ARE THE COSTS OF EXCLUDING THEM
'Just one additional year of secondary schooling boosts girls' future earning potential by 15-25%. In Kenya that means national income could jump $3.4 billionalmost 10% -if all Kenyan schoolgirls completed secondary school and the 220,000 adolescent mothers avoided pregnancy'.
INVESTING IN GIRLS HELPS SOLVE GLOBAL CHALLENGES.
'Investing in adolescent girls is critical to a sustainable future for us all. Adolescent girls can accelerate change on issues ranging from climate change to peace and security'. exhortations to buy and/or display specially-branded consumer merchandise (see Chant, 2015; also Calkin, 2015; Koffman and Gill, 2013) . While, even then, appeals to unified sisterhood and mobilisation on the part of Girl Effect and Girl Up might be justifiably desirable, other downsides include the reinforcement of 'colonial notions of civilising and saving the racialised Other' (Shain, 2013:3) , and the questionable production of: there are obvious dangers in terms of perpetuating 'essentialising oppositional stereotypes of male "egoism" and "irresponsibility"
versus female "altruism" and "self-sacrifice"' (Chant and Sweetman, 2012: 524; see also Brickell and Chant, 2010; Cornwall, 2014; Cornwall, Edström and Grieg, eds, 2011; Edström, 2015; Koffman and Gill, 2013:98; Parpart, 2015) .
Aside out of poverty that is caused in part by the very institutions that purport to save them' (see also Calkin, 2015:664; Koffman and Gill, 2013:90; Roberts, 2015:222; Shain, 2013:2) NEW -Asante, 2015; Antrobus, 2004; Cornwall and Edwards, 2015; Saith, 2006; Sweetman, 2005) .
In many ways, the SDGs do offer new promise, both in the form of a broadened new stand-alone goal (SDG 5) on gender ('Achieve Gender Equality and Empower All Women and Girls'), and demands (albeit yet to be confirmed) to mainstream gender targets in all goals. Within SDG 5 it appears there will be exhortations to tackle gender-based violence, gendered inequalities in resources and capabilities, and women's representation and leadership at all levels of politics and governance (UNOPW, 2014; UN Women, 2015) . In respect of gendered inequalities in resources and capabilities, the eradication of women's Step it Up for Gender Equality', given the partial and remedial thrust of on-the-ground interventions thus far, its would appear that women and girls are not being empowered to make any choices other than those which tie them ever more inextricably to serving others. As summarised by Cornwall and Edwards (2010:2) , empowerment as framed by development agencies means that this is often pursued under conditions 'that are not of their own [women's] choosing'.
Rationales for female involvement in CCTs, microfinance, and 'Girl Effect'-type initiatives appear to be deeply rooted in a range of reactive gendered essentialisms, in which there seems to be insufficient political will to transform inegalitarian gendered responsibilities for livelihoods, to challenge male power and privilege, or to destabilise socially and geographically inequitable macro-economic structures (see Chant, 2008; Cornwall, 2014; Johnson, 2005; Zuckerman, 2007) . Current policy responses to the 'feminisation of poverty' require even more time, effort and obligation on the part of women and girls which drives home the argument made by Elson (1999:13) nearly two decades back that women are an 'over-utilised not an under-utilised resource' (emphasis in original).
When gendered norms and relations continue largely unaddressed except in the form of being co-opted and exploited, then disparities are arguably prone not only to reproduction, but also to intensification. This brings to bear the crucial paradox identified by Molyneux (2007) that female-only policy interventions have probably played a part in the resilience of traditional gendered norms. In CCT programmes this includes the reinforcement of maternal altruism; in the context of microfinance, the all-too-frequent scenario where men command the economic resources garnered by women (Chant, 2014) , and in relation to 'investing in girls', gender-uneven expectations and dividends for the future. Indeed, if the vogue for the types of antipoverty policies which have been pursued to date continues it might well be anticipated that claims upon younger generations of women will multiply further, not least on the part of fathers, spouses and sons who have so far been largely and conspicuously sidelined from formal gender-transformative initiatives. Indeed, the pressures on young women might be particularly intense where populations are masculinised as a result of cumulative legacies of female marginalisation and sex-selective abortion, not to mention female infanticide.
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In this light, the proposals of UN Women (2013 Women ( ,2015 and the UN Open 
